Benthic Canada

Vodka on the Rocks
by Kevin Dekker (January 30, 2006)

The Mikhail Lermontov - A brief history

The building of the Mikhail Lermontov can be traced back to the years just after World War Two when the Soviet Union embarked on a large ship building program, part of which was carried out at the MTW shipyards in Wismar, East Germany.

At 176 metres / 577 feet and with a gross tonnage of 20,500, the Ivan Franko class were the largest passenger ships then built by an East German shipyard. As such they became symbols of the renewed industrial capacity of East Germany.

The final of five Ivan Franko class ships completed was the Mikhail Lermontov which was handed over in March 1972.

As with all Soviet-built merchant ships these ships were designed for rapid conversion to military use. The Ivan Franko class vessels would have made very useful military transports; they featured a hull strengthened for ice, reasonable speed of 20 knots at full maximum, large cargo capacity, vehicle decks, and a very good range of 10,000 miles.

The original design included no less than six large cargo handling cranes arranged in two superimposed pairs forward with another pair aft. The resulting balanced profile with staggered cranes forward gave the ships a purposeful appearance.

The ships were originally fitted out to carry 750 passengers and had a typical crew complement of 330. In 1982 the Mikhail Lermontov received her largest and final facelift. Her cabins were reconfigured to carry only 550 passengers, but in greater comfort.

Profile of the Mikhail Lermontov (Illustration: Kevin Dekker)

A summer cruise in the South Pacific

In 1985-86 the Mikhail Lermontov was chartered to travel company 'CTC' for a summer cruising season in the South Pacific with stopovers in Australia and New Zealand. The passengers on cruise number 561 from Sydney included a large contingent of Australians.

She left Sydney on the 7th of February 1986 and visited a number of north eastern New Zealand ports before arriving in Wellington on the 15th of February. A brief stop allowed passengers the opportunity of sightseeing in New Zealand's capital city.

Captain Don Jamison (Photo: Kevin Dekker)

Joining the vessel while she was in Wellington was the Marlborough Harbour Board Pilot and Acting General Manager Captain Don Jamison. He was to pilot the vessel into and out of the restricted waters of the Marlborough Sounds during her visit to Picton on the 16th. He was also qualified to act as Pilot in Milford Sound and it had been arranged that he would carry out this duty under a private contract when the ship reached Fiordland. Just who Jamison was actually working for at various stages of the cruise would later be contested in court as the Baltic Shipping Company sought to recover some of its losses as a result of the sinking. Also joining the ship to assist Jamison was Captain G.F. Neill, Marlborough's Deputy Harbour Master who was receiving pilotage training.

The 52 year old Pilot Captain Jamison had spent 15 years at sea attaining the rank of Chief Officer before coming ashore and working for the Southland Harbour Board as Tug Master and Pilot. In 1970 he was appointed Harbour Master at Picton. He was described as enjoying an excellent reputation with the Soviet Navigators and had previously piloted the Mikhail Lermontov's sister ship Alexander Pushkin into Picton.

A series of decisions to navigate through restricted waters

Leading up to the sinking Jamison had been working long hours including involvement in legal proceedings. He later implied that as a result of his workload he was mentally and physically exhausted when he took the Lermontov out of Picton, but was not aware of his condition at the time. His working day while piloting the ship in and out of Picton was a long one. He had some drinks the night the ship departed Wellington then was up at 5:00 a.m. the following morning to guide the ship in through Tory channel. He was again piloting the ship at 5:37 p.m. that evening over twelve hours later having consumed more alcohol that day.

In command of the ship was captain Vladislav Vorobyov. Since October he had been relieving the regular Captain, Aram Oganov, who was taking long service leave but was due to rejoin the ship on its return to Sydney.

The vessel set sail from Wellington at midnight on the 15th of February. Just before daybreak the following morning she was off the entrance of Tory Channel. The vessel's agent had arranged for a helicopter to take pictures of her steaming through the Marlborough Sounds so the Captain waited until daybreak (7 a.m.) before allowing the Pilot to negotiate the narrow entrance.

Tory Channel was an unusual route inbound to Picton for a ship of the Lermontov's size. Although the scenery here can be impressive, the early morning timing meant most passengers would still be in bed and the dreary weather was not conducive to sightseeing. Most visiting ships of the Lermontov's size used the safer Queen Charlotte Sound route. Taking the vessel in through this narrow channel marked the first of a series of decisions to navigate the ship through restricted waters rather than through the main shipping channels.

Course of the Mikhail Lermontov: The red line indicates the Mikhail Lermontov's course into Picton following the inter-island ferry route. This was an unusual route for large visiting ships, which normally use the safer Queen Charlotte Sound entry indicated by the blue line. (Illustration: Kevin Dekker)

Setting the scene for disaster

Ironically, Jamison's confident handling of the ship through Tory Channel helped set the scene for impending disaster. The Russian officers on the bridge were at first uncomfortable with the close proximity of the rocks as the ship negotiated the narrow passage but Jamison confidently guided the ship through this entry. He completed the mornings' duties by docking the ship in Picton at 8 a.m. without the assistance of tugs. After witnessing such a display the Russians would be inclined to accept the Pilot's judgement in future.

Present on the bridge at that time were Chief Navigator Stephanishchev and Second Mate Gusev, the two Russian officers who would be on the bridge when Jamison made his decision to take the ship through the Cape Jackson passage.

Gusev was later reported as stating that the Pilot, "very competently manoeuvred the ship through the passage and into Tory Channel. His actions were sure and clear. He performed the same sure actions when turning between Cape Jackson and the lighthouse."

With the ship berthed in Picton, passengers had a variety of activities ashore to choose from. There were bus trips to wineries, boat trips around the Sounds, or just a leisurely stroll around the township of Picton. The sight of a visiting cruise liner in Picton dominated the small port and most locals could only think with envy of the exotic holiday experiences being shared by the passengers.

A vodka or two!

The vessel was the scene of a luncheon reception and the first hint of controversy. How much alcohol was consumed by those present including Jamison? Was it possible that the tired and overworked Pilot could have been affected by even a small amount of alcohol? Don Jamison reportedly had two Vodkas and a glass of beer at the reception. Of his decision to drink that day before taking the ship out Jamison stated:

"I considered I was not impaired by any consumption of alcohol. However again in hindsight it may be indicative of my condition in that I would normally never consume alcohol for several hours prior to carrying out a pilotage function, and would normally have requested in such circumstances a glass of fruit juice or something similar."

According to one report, Jamison had requested a good cabin be made available for himself and his wife. After completing his Pilot duties he would effectively be on holiday and taking a well earned break. He visited his office ashore but when he returned to the ship his wife did not accompany him. What would make her miss the opportunity of a cruise through Fiordland and then on to Sydney? Whatever the reason, it was to be a fortuitous decision, for the next leg of the ship's cruise would be anything but routine.

Leaving Picton

The ship sailed from Picton just after 3 p.m. with 408 passengers and 330 crew aboard. The passengers looked forward to a cruise down the South Island's West Coast and the beautiful scenery of Milford Sound. Little did they know they were not to view those majestic vistas on this cruise. A series of near groundings foreshadowed approaching disaster.

The first close encounter with the shore occurred when the vessel backed out of the wharf and turned to leave Picton. The stern came perilously close to the shore on the eastern side of the harbour. A crew member commented he had never seen a ship so close to the shore. One passenger thought that the ship had touched lightly on a sand bank near the shore.

Wreck of the Edwin Fox: This wreck in Shakespeare Bay was of interest to Australian passengers as this ship carried immigrants and convicts to their country. The Edwin Fox is now on display in Picton and is one of the oldest floating ships in the world. (Photo: Kevin Dekker)

The vessel then nosed out of Picton harbour but instead of heading straight out of the Sounds, Jamison decided to take her into Shakespeare Bay. He wanted to give passengers a view of the remains of the historic sailing vessel 'Edwin Fox', one of the oldest wooden merchant ships in existence. Shakespeare Bay was a very small area for a ship of the Mikhail Lermontov's size to manoeuvre in and a tight turn was required. The ship did not respond as Jamison had anticipated and the engines had to be put full astern to prevent another grounding. A crew member on the bow estimated that the ship came within 30 meters of the shore. The Pilot had assumed the bow thrusters were available to assist in turning the ship. In fact they had been turned off but no one had informed him of this, and it took 30 seconds from first switching the system on before it could be used.

In the midst of all this Jamison slipped and fell, hitting his head in the process. He recovered his composure and appeared to have suffered no obvious injury so continued conning the ship. Was this fall indicative of the alcohol he had recently consumed and did the blow to the head further compound the effects of fatigue and alcohol? No one else on the bridge interpreted the incident in this light even though they had no trouble with their own footing.

Shortly after this incident the Pilot discussed the course with the Captain and they agreed that in view of the weather the passengers would not be interested in sightseeing and that it would be best to slowly steam out of Queen Charlotte Sound.

The Pilot is instructed to keep further from the shore

If the previous events had shaken the Pilot it did not alter his persistence to take the vessel close to shore and through restricted channels. The usual route for vessels leaving Picton is to the East of Allports Island. Jamison chose to take her behind the island. This necessitated a hard turn to starboard to clear Golden Point. Once again the ship passed dangerously close to the shore. One cruise staff member later commented that it seemed they were so close if she had reached out her hand she could have touched the land.

Captain Vorobyov was concerned by this incident and instructed the Pilot to maintain a greater distance from the shore.

At about 4 p.m. the watch crew change occurred on the bridge. Those on duty now included Chief Navigator Sergey Stephanishchev, Second Mate Sergey Gusev, and Helmsman Anatoliy Burin. Neither the Chief Navigator or the Second Mate had been on the bridge during the earlier near misses. They had last seen Jamison in action when he gave the flawless display of ship handling through Tory Channel that morning and had little reason to doubt his judgement.

At 4:15 p.m. Assistant Pilot Neill disembarked onto the pilot boat, near Luke Rock. After this, the Pilot again discussed the planned route with the Captain. The Captain apparently changed his mind from his earlier decision and insisted that the purpose of the voyage was to show the passengers the best of the scenery. With the permission of the Captain, Jamison increased the speed of the ship to the full manoeuvring speed of 15 knots. As with most vessels, the big ship would answer the helm more positively at speed. Jamison probably anticipated the need for such responsiveness as he planned further close-up views of the scenery.

The Captain leaves the bridge

At about 4:30 p.m. the Captain left the bridge having instructed the Chief Navigator that the Pilot had changed the planned course and would manoeuvre the ship into Ship Cove. The cruise then carried on relatively uneventfully towards the outer Queen Charlotte Sound. However, after visiting Ship Cove Jamison took the ship out to the west of Motuara Island. Again this was an unusual course for a large ship like the Lermontov.

Captain Vorobyov justified leaving the bridge on the grounds that he had to change his wet clothes, yet he was still absent from the bridge over an hour later when the ship struck the rocks. He had instructed the Chief Navigator to call him when the ship reached Ship Cove. He was called at this time but merely acknowledged the call and did not return to the bridge. By informing the Chief Navigator that the Pilot had changed the planned course and would stay close to shore he had effectively handed control of the ship to the Pilot who now had a free reign in the navigation of the vessel.

The Captain's decision to leave the bridge while the ship was in restricted waters was unusual. A captain has overall responsibility for the safety of the ship even with a pilot on board and under the Soviet system could expect to be held completely accountable. Another Ex-Soviet captain has commented that leaving the bridge under such circumstances would have been unthinkable to him.

By 5:10 p.m. the Lermontov had cleared Ship Cove and was on course to the open water beyond Cape Jackson. David Baker who at that time lived at the Cape Jackson Homestead recalled seeing the ship pass between Motuara Island and the mainland. He described it as a magnificent sight and unusual because they had never seen such a large ship taking that course before. As the ship passed North of Motuara Island it passed beyond the pilotage limit but it was still in the Queen Charlotte Harbour limits. The ship's officers did not assume control and take an active role in the navigation of the ship other than to plot the ship's progress. It was a decision they would later regret but understandable given that the ship was still in the Pilot's local area. Of those who were on the bridge he should have been the best man to navigate the ship in that area. He was also the local Harbour Master and with the ship still within the harbour limits it could be argued that any navigational instructions he issued in this area were binding instructions to the crew.

Cape Jackson

At 5:21 p.m. Jamison ordered the first of three incremental course changes to port that would send the ship onto the rocks at Cape Jackson. Had this first new heading been maintained it would still have allowed the ship to safely clear the headland and the reef that extended out to Walker rock. Jamison had been giving a commentary on the ship's public address system up to this point then said goodbye to the passengers. He hung up the microphone and told Second Mate Gusev he no longer required the P.A. Apparently the microphone may have been left on as some passengers reported hearing what sounded like an argument between Jamison and someone else on the bridge as the ship approached Cape Jackson.

At 5:30 p.m. when the ship was off Waihi Point, Jamison ordered a second turn to port, now heading the ship directly at the Cape Jackson Lighthouse. This change of course with only 7 minutes to run until the ship reached the lighthouse necessitated a further change of course within a very short period of time. In placing the ship on this course one assumes that Jamison had considered what he would do before reaching the lighthouse. The only reasonable order would have been a turn to starboard to clear the lighthouse and Walker Rock. The Cape Jackson inner channel ahead of the ship was clearly visible through the forward bridge windows and had been since the ship rounded Waihi Point.

Gusev indicated to Stepanishchev that the ship was heading towards danger. Stepanishchev questioned Jamison about his new course and was told he was going to show Cape Jackson to the passengers.

At 5:34 p.m. with the ship rapidly approaching the lighthouse Jamison made a sudden, spur of the moment decision and ordered a further turn to port committing the ship to a course through the Cape Jackson passage, rather than turning to starboard to clear the dangerous reef.

Second Mate Gusev told the Chief Navigator that he saw currents meeting in the area between Cape Jackson and the lighthouse. The Chief Navigator then asked Jamison whether the passage through there was possible. The Pilot answered with words to the effect that he intended to pass through there, that he knew that place, and that everything would be alright.

The Cape Jackson Lighthouse was almost directly ahead. The Pilot gave the command Port 10 and the ship moved to port towards the passage between the cape and the lighthouse. The ship entered the passage closer to the shore than to the lighthouse. The Pilot gave the order "midships" then "steady so." As the ship approached the passage the approximate course was 325 degrees True.

The Chief Navigator was checking the distance from the cape on the radar and when the ship was 7 or 8 cables (almost a mile) off the cape, the ship was heading between the cape and the lighthouse. Even at full manoeuvring speed of fifteen knots there was still time to reconsider the decision to take the ship through the passage. The decision may have been made on the spur of the moment but obviously Jamison was happy to persist with this course.

Initially the Chief Navigator was not concerned about the Pilot's intention to take the ship through the passage as he believed the assurances he had just been given about the safety of such a course. However as the ship neared the passage he noticed turbulent water indicating strong currents. Fearing these might push the ship off course he stood by the engine telegraphs ready to give split forward and astern commands to the engines to assist in maintaining the desired heading. The vessel did not appear to be affected by these tidal currents as it entered the passage and took the course the Pilot intended.

One of the passengers remembered looking out his cabin porthole and seeing the Cape Jackson Lighthouse with nothing behind it but open water. He thought it strange because a lighthouse usually marks an area of dangerous coast yet he could see no land. The reason the danger was not evident was because the ship was steaming right through the hazardous area rather than to seaward of it. Another passenger seeing white water ahead realised that the ship was heading into danger. "If we don't hit those rocks I'll eat my hat," he thought.

Jamison was of the understanding that a depth of 10 to 12 meters existed in the passage close to Cape Jackson and if true this would have been sufficient for the Mikhail Lermontov's 8.5 meter draught. He took the ship closer to Cape Jackson than the lighthouse, consistent with his previous manoeuvres that day taking the ship close to shore.

Study of the charts show that there was adequate depth for the Mikhail Lermontov to navigate the channel, as long as she avoided the major rocks! She appears to have struck Hawea Rock whose depth matches the damage on the port side. (Illustration: Kevin Dekker)

Impact!

Assistant Harbour Master Gary Neill later spoke to Don Jamison about those final moments before the grounding. Jamison compared his mental state during this period as similar to falling asleep at the wheel of a car at night and drifting off into the gravel. Perhaps the long hours he had been working finally caught up with him and he simply forgot that he was on a 20,000 ton cruise liner with a draught of over 8 meters. In such a state of fatigue the possibility must also be considered that the effects of his earlier consumption of alcohol or his fall in Shakespeare Bay had further impaired his judgement.

At 5:37 p.m. the ship struck a rock close to Cape Jackson. A series of about three shocks was felt through the vessel lasting only two or three seconds. The ship struck approximately five and a half meters below the waterline on the port side, buckling the hull plates inward and shearing open a tear in the hull a further half meter below that. Such a depth corresponds with the depth of Hawea Rock at the time of impact about three hours before low tide at Cape Jackson. The Helmsman reported that the ship was thrown a little to the right, further indication that the impact was on the port side. He tried to steady the ship on its previous course.

The ship hit with a sudden jolt that sent wine glasses flying in the Bolshoi Lounge. One or two passengers were thrown from their feet by the totally unexpected impact.

Many witnesses felt that the shocks had come from the starboard side of the ship. Jamison thought the ship had struck on the starboard side about the vicinity of the bridge and continued as if the vessel ran over a sharp pinnacle, but since the shocks only lasted a few seconds this could not have been the case. The shock of a grounding along the bottom of the ship would have been felt for longer than two or three seconds.

Staff Captain Melnik who was in his cabin at the time of impact recalled that there were about three shocks from the direction of the bow. This is consistent with the damage to the port side of the hull. Almost immediately the vessel developed a list to starboard. That may seem strange given that the ship was holed on the port side but the vessel left Picton trimmed two degrees to starboard so water entering the ship would flow to the lower starboard side. The impact low down on the port side where the hull plates begin to curve under the ship may also have had the effect of throwing the ship over to starboard.

First Engineer Boris Alekseev was on duty in the Main Engine Room at the time of impact. It seemed to him that the shocks were coming from the area of the port bow back to the Auxiliary Engine Room.

Directly after the impact there was shocked silence on the bridge. Because the ship suffered only a glancing blow and had carried on through the channel the seriousness of the incident was not immediately apparent but there would certainly be some damage. Each senior officer on the bridge experienced the sinking feeling of knowing they were partly responsible and there would be hell to pay for such a blunder.

Why are we in this place?

The Russians claimed Jamison then ordered a further turn to port, although the Pilot himself could not recall giving such an order after the impact. The helmsman had attempted to correct the jolt to starboard and this action may have been misinterpreted by some as a further turn to port.

Alarmed officers began hurrying to the bridge. A large patch of dirty water could be seen astern marking the point of impact.

When the Captain returned to the bridge he was furious and immediately took control turning the ship to starboard and towards open water. He asked the Chief Navigator to explain why the ship was in its present position. The Chief Navigator replied that on the recommendation of the Pilot they had steered the ship between the cape and the lighthouse. The Captain asked if he had agreed to that and was told that the Pilot had insisted the passage was safe.

The Captain then asked the shocked and confused Pilot what had happened and received the reply: "I don't know."

It was obvious that the ship had hit something but the extent of the damage was not yet known. It had been a glancing blow and there was some doubt that the hull had been penetrated. Usual practice when a submerged object had been hit would be the immediate closure of all watertight doors. However even before this could be done considerable amounts of water flooded from damaged compartments into adjacent ones.

Extent of flooding: Maximum possible extent of flooding in the four watertight compartments initially affected. It has never been explained why the compartment forward of the Auxiliary Engine Room flooded as it was well aft of the damaged area of the ship. Subsequent diver inspections suggest one or more watertight doors were open in the affected areas when the ship sank. (Illustration: Kevin Dekker)

Water pours in

Damage control parties were dispatched to assess the situation throughout the ship but no one had to tell crew members working in the Refrigerated Stores compartment on Deck 5 what had happened. Working directly above the impact point they heard the horrifying sound of rock on tortured metal and felt the deck below them flex upwards as the hull was severely deformed. The rocks opened up the water tanks on the deck directly below them, while lower still a line of dents ran along the double bottom, a kind of "crumple zone" designed to absorb just such impacts. The upper tank joints were no doubt ruptured as the hull buckled inwards and a loose access panel located in one of the tank tops may have added significantly to the amount of water flowing upwards into the dry compartments above.

Crew members in this area bolted for the nearest stairway to the higher decks, fearing that one of their number was still in the general area. Refrigeration Engineer Parvee Zagliadimov was last seen working in this area. When the impact occurred, heavy food laden trolleys intended for that night's dinner rolled against the door he was seen to have entered, jamming it shut. Inflowing water also began building up against the door making it almost impossible for him to escape if he was still in that compartment.

A report came from the Engine Room that water was entering the Refrigerated Store followed by reports of flooding in the Laundry, Gymnasium, Refrigeration Machinery Compartment, and the Printing Room. The starboard ballast tanks and the swimming pool were pumped out in an attempt to reduce the list to starboard which quickly developed to about 10 degrees.

The Chief Engineer carried out an inspection of some of the affected areas. There was a continuous flow of water back into the Refrigeration Machinery Compartment from the Refrigerated Stores area, with sufficient strength to make closer inspection impossible. The bulkheads of the Refrigeration Machinery Compartment appeared to be intact so the flooding was originating forward of this point. The Chief Engineer reported that he closed the watertight door between the Refrigeration Machinery Compartment and the Air Conditioning Compartment on the starboard side of Deck 5 under local control, however Navy divers who later searched this area looking for the missing Refrigeration Engineer suggested this door was found open.

The fact that the Refrigeration Compartments on Deck 5 could be inspected several minutes after impact proves that the rate of flooding was not as great as some claims suggest. The rather fanciful figure of 63 tonnes per second has often been quoted as the initial rate of flooding. Nevertheless she was shipping water at an alarming rate.

Vodka on the Rocks - Part [ 1 | 2 | 3 ]